Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, you probably found yourself asking how Putin’s regime justified the outbreak of this conflict, at least once. In light of the heightened visibility gained by some shared principles — such as the prohibition of the use of legitimate force with aggressive purposes and the preservation of others’ territorial integrity — especially after the Second World War and the long peacetime experienced by European people, how could this conflict take place? 

Currently, we are witnesses to a radical evolution of the international system and therefore of one of the most ancient political instruments for dispute resolution, namely war. Despite it all, there is still one element that remains unchanged, that is to say, the nature of human beings. Although the reasoning capabilities of the masses have been the object of debate in the past, it is clear that political intensity maintains its relevance, especially in a war context.

When it comes to legitimising a military intervention, if not aggression, academic mobilisation plays a fundamental role in manipulating the crowd’s feelings by orienting propagandistic activities on behalf of the government. Of the rest, War is a social phenomenon in which two (or more) conflicting social groups, with their ideas, perceptions, values and behavioural schemes, confront each other in a series of tactical events. Domestic cohesion results from a successful integrative process under a centralised political institution capable of securing and sustaining the allegiance of its citizens.

Propaganda can be defined as a way to appeal to the people by deliberately spreading “ideas, facts, or allegations [to spin] one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause”. In political discourse, history often turns into an essential tool of propaganda. 

The weaponisation process can be attributed to the Russian authorities just after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, when the four conditions set by Wolfrum were contemporaneously met. First and foremost, history must be used as legitimation for aggressive politics. Secondly, it must serve the purposes of mobilisation and integration of majorities. Thirdly, it must promote the exclusion of minorities. At last, the political or historical discourse must be permeated with sovereignty claims. 
Hence, to better understand the role of ideology in war, it may be useful to exploit the two models of interpretation offered by Anatol Rapoport in his introduction to “On War” by Von Clausewitz, published in 1968. Rapoport wrote, “the way people think, talk, and write about war is crucial for understanding the role of war in human affairs and the fate of civilisation”, and added that “the nature of war is itself to a large extent determined by how man conceives of it”.

The first “model of interpretation” is the political-military one. It is strictly related to the “political philosophy of war”, whose essence can be well explained through the words of Clausewitz. According to him, “war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument”, concluding that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. The States constantly play in a hostile strategic environment in which each actor aims to win the game. 

The Russian propaganda presents the West as an actor fully responsible for the escalation. The United States and its allies have turned Ukraine into their vassal and created a conflict at Russia’s western border to weaken it. The political sense of the war is explained regarding the ongoing evolution of the world order towards a multipolar system, allegedly hindered by the hostile West, which is accused of ‘ignoring’ or abusing international norms. Therefore, the current order is inherently unjust towards those countries that want to preserve their sovereignty. 

Some Russian scholars go as far as to consider the extent of the possible outcomes of the tantamount radicality of the ones that characterised the aftermath of the Second World War. The success of Russia is expected to result in a complete renewal of the international order in a more equal and multipolar system. 

This model, alone, is persuasive but not comprehensive enough. Clausewitz suggested the importance of the “remarkable trinity of passion, reason and chance”. A war is not a fight between puppets. Conversely, it is a mutual interaction “between living forces”, whose actions are driven by “a reckoning of costs and benefits”, as well as by a “primordial violence, hatred and enmity”.

The conflict can be interpreted as an identity war; Russia’s existence is at stake. The reunification of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in the Russian world is conceived (or presented) as a historic mission. Aiming to create a common civilisational entity and reproduce the Reign of the Kievan Rus, which disappeared in the middle of the 13th century after the Mongolian invasion, the Kremlin exploits a revisionist historical propaganda soaked in mythical, heroic, and religious rhetoric mixed with imperial nostalgia. 

The evolution of the war forced a change in rhetoric. Since the beginning of the special operation in 2022, the idea of a tripartite unity of all Russians — namely, Great, Little (Ukrainian), and White (Belarusian) — has been replaced with a conception that considers Ukraine just Lenin’s creation and the result of his wicked political choices, further delegitimising its opponent. 

Russia does not consider the current conflict as international because the Kremlin does not even recognise the independent sovereignty of Ukraine, which is deemed to be a “vassal” of the West, frequently depicted as a satanic force or the ‘Antichrist’, aiming to destroy Russia’s statehood. It is a civil war. 

The collaborationist government and the political institutions of Ukraine must be eliminated, including anyone who does not grant one’s allegiance to the Russian Motherland. For this reason, re-educational and institutional plans have been designed for the aftermath. 

Furthermore, some scholars state that Russia is “saving Ukraine” by halting the expansion of destructive Western influence pursued by hybrid aggression. War results from the imposition of someone else’s — the Western — will on Russia. This interpretation relies on a pervasive “us vs. them” rhetoric to justify a preemptive war. In Russia, nationalism is conceived as patriotism, while in former Soviet republics, it is cast as extremism. For instance, the Russian government justifies its actions by claiming the need for the denazification of a corrupt and authoritarian Ukraine. The so-called “Special Operation” is frequently framed through an analogy with the Great Patriotic War — Russia’s term for World War II — in which impeccable Soviet soldiers triumphed over fascism.  

This historical revisionism also distorts the domestic narrative of the Bucha massacre, where numerous civilians were killed during the Russian occupation in 2022. Russian propaganda falsely claimed that the atrocity was either staged or manipulated by the West to wrongfully incriminate Russian forces, insisting that only Nazi forces would commit such crimes.

_{A Russian military cadet stands in front of a billboard promoting contract army service in St. Petersburg . Olga Maltseva/AFP/Getty Images}

The ongoing conflict underscores the evolving nature of war in the modern era, where propaganda serves as a battlefield as significant as any physical front. The ability to control historical discourse and shape collective memory remains a powerful instrument in justifying aggression, suppressing dissent, and sustaining prolonged warfare. 

The ‘weaponisation’ of history is not merely an instrument of legitimisation of Russian military actions, but also a tool to strengthen domestic cohesion and rally support for its aggressive policies. 

Given that historical revisionism is not a novel phenomenon, understanding these mechanisms is essential not only for analyzing the Russo-Ukrainian war, but also for recognizing similar patterns in future conflicts across the globe.

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