Picture in Evidence: ‘Step into your place’: British propaganda poster, 1915
Report I ~ Russo-Ukrainian War: Conventional or Unconventional?
By Lorenzo De Carolis
Introduction
The conflict in Ukraine is a relevant case study to understand the contemporary transformation of war, in which the boundaries between conventional and unconventional are blurring. From the long parable of delegitimization of the last century, the war saw an evolution in the 1990s and, even more significantly, following the proclaimed “global war on terror”, in which the traditional categories of interstate warfare were called into question. In this context, the analysis of the war in Ukraine raises fundamental questions about the nature of the conflict and the implications of today’s international society and the international system. This report, in collaboration with Rebecca Musiu, aims to analyse the two different, but extremely linked aspects of this conflict: the very nature of this war and the ideological confrontation around it. In order to do this, this article will be divided in two parts in which we will analyse the two different factors.
War in Ukraine: Continuity or Discontinuity?
The conflict in Ukraine presents peculiar characteristics. On the one hand it may seem like a conventional conflict, given that both sides have now engaged in an armed confrontation over a territorial dispute, showing the classic paradigms of war between states. According to this perspective, unconventional methods (such as hybrid, asymmetric warfare and terrorist acts) are a category reserved for or towards non-state actors with primary objectives aimed at civilians. Thus, defining the conflict in Ukraine as a non-conventional war is excluded since the interstate confrontation falls within the scope of international humanitarian law.
Servicemen of the 65th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine undergo combat cohesion in Ukraine, on September 12, 2024. (Photo by Ukrinform/NurPhoto)
On the other side, with a closer examination, it can be identified as an example of hybrid warfare, characterized by the integration of conventional instruments. Hybrid warfare includes operations below the threshold of declared war, combining military, political, economic and information tools. However, even from this definition, a contradiction arises, as the ongoing conflict is an open war between states and does not fall below the threshold of war. From this perspective, the war in Ukraine, while showing the typical traits of an interstate conflict, incorporates elements of hybrid warfare, including the coercion of civilians in occupied territories by Russia and Ukrainian false flag operations, used by Moscow to justify accusations of terrorism. Since unconventional acts have not been used in an open interstate war until now, this scenario further blurs the line between what is legitimate in war and what is not with respect to existing conventions, in light of the categories developed during the “global war on terror”.
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The precedent set by the global war on terror has allowed states to incorporate multiple unconventional methods into interstate warfare, opening up to a further proliferation of cheating of international law and the jus ad bellum. The indiscriminate nature of drone warfare and their precision are one of these elements. Considering US undisputed monopoly from the 1990s onwards (especially in Afghanistan and Iraq 2003), Russia has widely used unconventional methods, reducing the distinction between legality and illegality in order to limit the reactions of the international community. The interventions in Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Donbass represent clear precedents for this strategy and these approaches are being repeated in this conflict.
Therefore, despite the conventional aspects, this war recalls the strategic change that occurred after 9/11, when the very concept of war seemed to dematerialize, reducing the importance of the physical space of the conflict.
So, Russo-Ukrainian war shows signs of continuity with the past 20 years, especially from the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to the first phase of the second invasion in 2022. But also signs of discontinuity and a return of the past models, such as the large mass of armed forces on the front, with strong consequences on the current societies of both states.
Since the Donbass crisis began, the war itself has evolved. From 2014 to 2019, Kyiv considered it an anti-terrorist operation, while Russia viewed it as a civil war. Since the Russians supported the self-declared separatist republics, this allowed Moscow to assist them through unconventional tools, finally leading to the escalated conflict in 2022. In the first phase of the war, during and immediately after the Russian “Blitzkrieg” failed, it was mainly conducted through unconventional methods (such as indiscriminate violence against civilians), as Russia still regarded it as a civil war until the conflict finally stabilized.
An Introduction to the Ideological Confrontation
The call for a just war had also a strong influence. The current international system, characterized by high heterogeneity, has made the delegitimization of the adversary a fundamental strategic component. The label of terrorism is increasingly used as a synonym for crime, legitimizing the use of unconventional methods and contributing to the narrative of a just war (the good against the evil). Russia has adopted rhetoric similar to that of the Global War on Terror to justify its aggression, describing Ukraine as a “rogue state” to be denazified and using the rhetoric of the alleged genocide in Donbass. This has transformed the conflict into an ideological and propaganda confrontation, expanding the conflict beyond the traditional battlefield to include dimensions such as information, technology, cyber warfare and economic sphere.
A further delegitimization of Ukraine’s international personality is represented by Trump’s ongoing statements (“[Zelensky is] a dictator who refuses to call elections”) that could bring an important repercussion in the negotiations, yet seen during the summit in Riyadh on February 18, 2025 in which Ukraine was not invited, and even more during the Oval Office meeting. Nevertheless this position seems more like blackmail to push Ukraine to negotiate, as seen by Zelensky’s recent U-turn at Jeddah’s summit of March 11, 2025.
Riyadh summit of 18 February 2025 (ISPI)
Limited or Unlimited War?
In Clausewitzian terms, this state of conflict can be seen as an escalation of an apparent limited war (the first phase of 2022) to an unlimited war. A limited war due to the aims of Russian aggression, despite Putin initially describing it as a civil war, which is the opposite of a limited war as they historically turn into “absolute wars” (not exactly as Clausewitz intended them, as they are purely theoretical, but intended as a pure violence and the disruption of any clear distinction and rules). Then, it became an unlimited war especially because of the growing polarization, growing participation of external actors and the inability of some states to remain neutral. Clear examples of this shift are Sweden and Finland joining NATO, and Switzerland abandoning its traditional economic neutrality by adopting sanctions. At the same time, Russia changed its narrative: what was initially called a “special military operation” is now described as a “war of survival against the West”. However, this interpretation is mainly shared in Europe. Many countries in the so-called Global South still view this conflict as a traditional regional war. This is confirmed by the abstention of several states during UN General Assembly votes condemning Russia’s aggression in 2022 and in 2025.
Wikipedia – UNGA Resolution ES-11/1 and Resolution ES-11/7 [2022 – 2025];
Green: in favor; Red: Against; Yellow: Abstained; Light Blue: Absent
Conclusion
Therefore, the heterogeneity blurs the clear distinctions between traditional and unconventional war, but also the political categories used blur the distinction between limited war and unlimited war.
So, the war in Ukraine cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between conventional and unconventional, but must be analyzed as a dynamic multidimensional conflict. A dynamism that integrates symmetrical, asymmetrical and hybrid elements. Whether conflict between armies has brought conventional conflict back into vogue, it appears to have been incorporated into a multidimensional war model. In this context, technological superiority does not automatically guarantee victory, making the adoption of alternative strategies and unconventional combat methods crucial to achieving strategic objectives.
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